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Introduction

Over the past twenty-five years, a rich body of research on the policing of nineteenth-century Europe and North America has shown that, throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, military interventions in strikes and demonstrations was in decline in many areas of Europe.¹ The demilitarization of policing is generally regarded as a key feature in the modernization process of governance that marked a major step towards the limitation of random use of force and the development of non-lethal policing techniques. The linkage of demilitarization and modernity reflect a widespread assumption that extensive military involvement in policing can serve as an indicator for the repression and political backwardness of any particular regime.² Such a correlation may be tempting when looking at Imperial Russia or Italy. But how are we to understand that military involvement significantly increased in the French Third Republic and the Netherlands between 1890 and 1911,³ while it continued to fall in the German Empire?

A comparison of riot policing in two industrial areas in late nineteenth-century France and Germany indicates a far more complex relationship between the extent of military involvement and levels of repression. If military presence in France became very frequent, the majority of cases did not generate any violent confrontations beyond minor pushing, shoving and stone-throwing. In terms of heavy-handed policing and incidents with fatal consequences, the Prussians were only slightly behind the

French, despite the much lower degree of military involvement. This article argues that, rather than focusing on the extent of military involvement, one needs to consider the strategies underlying policing measures.

In recent interpretations of the German empire, there has been a remarkable change in the ways in which military intervention against civilians have been understood. In the 1960s to the 1980s, when nineteenth-century history was often understood in light of the subsequent descent into National Socialist dictatorship, interpretations of military involvement in the policing of strikes and demonstrations were generally described as the ultimate proof of the repressive and 'politically backward' nature of the German Empire.⁴ Over the past decade, numerous studies have emerged following the critique of the *Sonderweg* interpretation that dominated views of the German Empire during the 1970s and 1980s. This has led to a general reconsideration of the nature of the German Empire, describing the governance in the Wilhelmine era as far less authoritarian and inflexible than it appeared on the surface.⁵

This reconsideration of the German Empire has had implications for studies of nineteenth-century policing. In the early 1980s, Lüdtké's pioneering study stressed the militaristic, repressive and authoritarian nature of Prussian policing in the first half of the nineteenth century.⁶ Subsequent research on policing in the late nineteenth century still notes strong authoritarian and militaristic elements.⁷ However, these studies also recognize that widespread repression of disorder and effective implementation of draconian legislation and numerous police regulations were very difficult to achieve with permanently understaffed police forces. At the same time, all the recent studies on German policing observe that during the imperial era, the army was increasingly marginalized from riot policing. Several reasons are generally mentioned to explain the demilitarization of German policing. One is the development of the modern *Rechtstaat* that placed the legitimate use of force within the boundaries of the law.⁸ At the same time, it is argued that increasing concerns for public opinion, combined with fears of provoking major revolt and doubts about the reliability of conscript soldiers, made government authorities more cautious about calling upon military assistance.⁹

In Republican France the increasing frequency of military

involvement in protest policing appears contrary to the relative liberalism of the Republican regime, both in comparison with previous French regimes and with other contemporary European regimes. Particularly striking is the intensified use of soldiers against protesters during the years of centre-Left governments between 1899 and 1909.¹⁰ Moreover, in France the increased involvement of the army in the policing of social and political conflicts occurred during a period when the French police was significantly strengthened and professionalized.¹¹

In comparison with the demilitarization process in the German Empire, developments in France appear all the more paradoxical. As a political system, the French Third Republic could hardly be described as more politically backward or repressive than the German Empire. Nor had the French authorities less reason to be concerned about public opinion. Quite the contrary, since the fragile government coalitions of the French Third Republic were far more vulnerable to public criticism than was the case in the German Empire. Moreover, French authorities were painfully aware of the dangers of provoking more violent protest by heavy-handed military interventions, and had serious doubts about the reliability of conscript soldiers who might turn their weapons against established political authority.¹²

Contemporary as well as historical accounts have tended to criticize this use of the French army. Both military historians and historians sympathetic to the workers' movement and trade unionism argue that the measures implemented to police public protest were often out of proportion with the size and seriousness of the protest movement.¹³ Others have justified the use of troops with reference to the political fragility of the Republican regime, pointing out that it was faced with exceptionally serious threats from popular protest. These included major conflicts between opposing groups, and struggles between government and powerful forces within French society (the Catholic Church; the anti-Republican right; communist trade unions).¹⁴ In recent years, scholars working on French policing have also pointed to the serious understaffing of the French *gendarmerie* and municipal police who had difficulties handling large-scale unrest.¹⁵

This article presents an analysis of the dissimilar patterns of military intervention in the most turbulent areas in France and Germany: the Prussian province of Westphalia and the French region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais. It compares six aspects relating to

the challenge to the public order and the patterns of military intervention:

- (1) the frequency of military intervention;
- (2) the size of the population in the two areas, in particular, the proportion of industrial workers;
- (3) the number of policemen and *gendarmes* compared to the population;
- (4) types and size of conflicts to which the army was called;
- (5) the number of soldiers mobilized;
- (6) the duration of military intervention.

As the figures presented below will show, military participation in protest policing in France was not limited to conflicts that were far more extended and violent than major conflicts that took place in Westphalia. In fact, the majority of incidents in which the French army became involved were small conflicts where violence and disorder were only a possibility. Nor were the French authorities particularly badly provided with police and *gendarmerie* forces. Instead, what we observe are two dissimilar patterns of military presence. In France, the preventive mobilization of very large numbers of soldiers, as part of new policing strategies, was based on containment of violence rather than confrontation.

The comparison of military troops as riot police between the French Third Republic and the German Empire challenges our understanding of military participation as being simply a matter of repression. The use of troops in the French Third Republic shows that some additional aspects need to enter into the equation, notably the extent to which preparations for large-scale police operations — with or without military participation — were based on prevention rather than confrontation. To be sure, on a number of occasions, French governments were confronted indeed with exceptionally serious challenges to internal stability. However, this does not account for the extreme frequency with which large numbers of troops were deployed to police minor conflicts where violence had not yet occurred.

Challenge and Response: The Frequency of Military Involvement in Protest Policing

Estimating the frequency of domestic military intervention in France and Germany is difficult, since no statistical or continuous registration exists for either of the two countries. Information about incidents involving military troops comes from either the documents from the state administration and the army or from the press, and neither of these provides a comprehensive picture.

Nevertheless, all indications point to the conclusion that between 1889 and 1914, involvement of the Prussian army in protest policing had become a rather marginal phenomenon. On the basis of cases appearing in the German press, Richard Tilly numbers twenty-three instances of domestic military intervention in the entire German Empire between 1882–1913.¹⁶ This number appears consistent with those appearing in the documents left by the Prussian war ministry and Ministry of the Interior for the period 1889–1914.¹⁷ A careful scrutiny of these records reveal fourteen incidents where troops were mobilized within the German Empire, excluding Bavaria, and thirteen incidents where troops were kept ready to intervene, but never mobilized.¹⁸ Even if there are cases that are unrecorded in the ministerial records, the total number of military interventions between 1889 and 1913 appears to be less than twenty-five for the entire German Empire.

In Westphalia, which contained the most unruly industrial area in the German Empire, there were six incidents between 1889 and 1913 where troops were either mobilized or kept in their garrison ready for intervention.¹⁹ Only on three occasions — in May 1889, June 1899 and March 1912 — were the troops actually mobilized. The provincial civil administration's correspondence refers to these cases as the only incidents of this kind.²⁰ Similarly, General von Einem, who held the post of general commander in Münster from 1909 to 1913, describes the military intervention in March 1912 as the only incident occurring during his time in office.²¹ A systematic scrutiny of monthly reports from the district governor of the turbulent district of Arnsberg and of those from the local governors in the industrial areas of Gelsenkirchen and Recklinghausen for the period 1893–1905 does not reveal any other case of military intervention.²²

Against this background, the frequency of military involve-

ment in France appears all the more striking. The region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais is particularly well-documented by the military authorities for the years 1875–1914. During the first two decades of the Third Republic, the use of military troops during strikes in Nord-Pas-de-Calais still seemed to be a rather unusual event,²³ except for a few notorious cases such as the miners' strikes in Anzin in 1880 and again in 1884. However, this changed in the late 1880s. The Boulanger crisis of 1886–7 and the following strike wave of 1889–93 opened a busy period for the military authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais.

Between 1889 and 1914, the civil and military documents from this region reveal no less than eighty-three separate incidents where the army was contacted on the issue of public order maintenance. In sixty-seven of these instances, troops were mobilized, in the remaining sixteen instances troops were kept in their garrison ready for intervention. However, since the available sources only provide a very incomplete picture, seventy-eight incidents must be considered the minimum figure, while the actual number is likely to be a great deal higher. After the turn of the century, it is often difficult to distinguish one instance of military intervention from the next, because troops were often moved directly from one conflict to another. It is also worth noting that military interventions were not simply concentrated around the particularly turbulent periods such as the great strikes of October–November 1901 and 1902 or the spring of 1906. The army was called out on a rather regular basis throughout the year to a series of greater and minor instances of actual or potential public order disturbance. Thus, in December 1904 the general commander in Lille wrote to the Prefect of the *département* Nord that, during this year, there had not been one single day when soldiers were not mobilized somewhere in the area to ensure public order.²⁴ Yet, 1904 was far from being the most turbulent year of the decade.

The region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais was undoubtedly one of the most unruly of the French provinces. The annual statistics on labour conflicts published by the French Ministry of Labour since 1893²⁵ show that among the French provinces, the region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais — with its combination of mining areas, textile industry and three important ports — was particularly prone to strikes and political protest. However, other industrial regions, such as Le Creusot, Saint Etienne and the area of

Longwy also experienced military intervention on a regular basis. Similarly in the Paris area, and despite serious attempts by police prefect Lépine to maintain public order without military assistance, there were at least twenty occasions of military intervention over Lépine's time in office from 1893 to 1911.²⁶ Military presence was by no means uncommon in rural areas. There was large-scale military intervention in the conflicts among agricultural labourers in the South in 1904 and 1907, and during the implementation of unpopular anti-Catholic laws between 1902 and 1906, troops were mobilized even in traditionally very calm areas such as Brittany.

However incomplete the list of recorded cases may be, the eighty-three recorded cases in Nord-Pas-de-Calais between 1889 and 1913 clearly indicates a significant difference from the three cases of military intervention in Westphalia and an estimated thirty in the entire German Empire during the same period of time.

Potential for Popular Unrest and Alternatives to Military Assistance

The dissimilarities in the frequency of military involvement in the maintenance of public order in France and Prussia poses the question of whether the French authorities were confronted with more serious challenges to public order than their Prussian counterparts. To be sure, there was a tradition of violent public protest in France.²⁷ In particular, 1901–1913 were characterized by extended labour conflicts and nationwide protest movements.

With the end of the conservative era of the early Third Republic and the rise of radical trade unionism in France, there was increasing polarization among Republicans on the centre-Left and those on the radical Left. The centre-Left government of 1899–1909, including Combes, Clemenceau and Millerand, accepted some form of compromise with big business and the wealthy middle class. By contrast, the radical Left, including Jaurès and the communist CGT trade union, aimed at nothing less than the destruction of capitalism through the abolition of private ownership.

The army became a major instrument during the battle of strength between government and challengers from the far Left and the trade unions. Particularly contentious were the labour

disputes where the state was involved not only as guardian of law and order, but also as employer. At the same time, the implementation of unpopular anti-Catholic legislation brought successive governments into conflict with wide sections of the French population, both among the upper and middle classes and many traditionalists in rural communities. Any incidence of violence by protesters helped to justify the use of troops, with government authorities claiming that such measures were necessary in order to defend the republican institutions against the radical forces that aimed to undermine it. No less than thirty-nine protesters and five *gendarmes* and police officers were killed in confrontations.

On the other hand, it is important not to overestimate the potential for violence in France or to underestimate the potential for violence in Germany. Here, at least twenty-one protesters and two officers were killed in clashes between protesters and public forces between 1889 and 1914. By applying the same criteria for defining 'violent protest', Tilly et al. established some 500 incidents of violent protest in France between 1882 and 1913, compared to 214 incidents in Germany.²⁸ Even if there were more than twice as many violent incidents in France as compared with Germany, this does not account for the extremely dissimilar use of military troops.

Similarly, the comparative investigations of Böll on labour disputes in France, Germany and England show that both in terms of the number of workers going on strike, as well as the working days lost between 1890 and 1914, the figures for the German Empire are a great deal higher than for France.²⁹ Moreover, labour protests in France were characterized by a high number of small strikes that were joined by a limited number of people. In Germany, where the workforce was better organized than in France, strikes tended to mobilize a much greater number of people. Even though workers' organizations in Germany — in particular the Social Democratic Free Unions — did their best to discourage violence and riots, in Westphalia, attacks on strike-breakers and public forces were commonplace. Accordingly, German authorities were no less concerned than their French counterparts about the potential for violence and disorder during major labour disputes.

It is also worth noting that in Westphalia, both the overall population and the number of workers that were employed in

Table 1
The Increase in the Number of Miners 1888–1912

	Westphalia	Nord-Pas-de-Calais
1888	105,000	51,000
1912	322,000	120,000

heavy industry were significantly higher than in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. While the entire population of the two *départements* Nord and Pas-de-Calais increased from 1.8 million by 1851 to 2.9 million in 1906, the six counties (*Kreise*) constituting the industrial areas around the River Ruhr had a population exceeding 3 million by the turn of the century, while the population of the Westphalian province exceeded 4.1 million in 1910. In particular the mining sector, the most unruly profession, employed two to three times as many people in Westphalia than in Nord-Pas-de-Calais (see Table 1).

In Westphalia, a large proportion of the industrial workers were young single men from the eastern provinces of Prussia, who integrated badly into local society; moreover, many were discriminated against by employers and local authorities as Poles and Catholics. The rapidly-expanding industrial towns in Westphalia were characterized therefore by a highly volatile and unruly population of young single men.³⁰ By contrast, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais the unskilled workers in the mining, metal and textile industries were recruited primarily from the rural population of Nord-Pas-de-Calais.³¹ Most workers lived in families and were well integrated into local society. Although there was a high proportion of Italian and Belgian migrant workers in the area, the discrimination against these and their isolation within local society was less dramatic than in the case of Polish workers in Westphalia.

The dissimilar size of the labour-intensive sectors is reflected in the number of workers joining the great strikes. In terms of the sheer number of striking workers, the great strikes that occurred in Westphalia were significantly more extended than the major conflicts that took place in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. In the French case, the two most extended labour conflicts were the miners' strike of 1902, joined by some 70,000, and the strike wave during the spring of 1906. Although the strike wave included

several of the main professions (mining, textile industries and transport), annual statistics from the Ministry of Industry registered merely 92,191 strikers in Nord and Pas-de-Calais of all professions for the entire year of 1906.³² By contrast, when great labour conflicts broke out in Westphalia, both the number of potential and actual strikers was significantly higher than the number of people who participated in labour conflicts occurring in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. The Westphalian miners' strike of 1889 was joined by 90,000 miners. More than 200,000 miners went on strike in January 1905, and during the great miners' strike of March 1912, 190,000 out of 320,000 miners joined the strike movement. There does not appear to be any immediate correlation between the extent of the labour conflicts occurring in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais and the propensity of the authorities to request assistance from the army.

The Strength and Availability of Civilian Forces of Order

In light of increasingly organized protest movements — in particular labour conflicts — the debate arose in both France and Germany of how public authorities should respond to challenges to public order. Throughout the period, Prussian as well as French authorities complained that police and *gendarmierie* forces were desperately understaffed to meet the challenges of major labour conflicts.³³ Therefore, it is worthwhile examining whether French prefects had significantly fewer policemen and *gendarmes* at their disposition as compared with the police and *gendarmierie* forces that were available to Prussian authorities.

In France, the shooting of nine striking workers at Fourmies on May Day, 1891 raised increasing political pressure for finding alternatives to policing protest with young inexperienced conscript soldiers.³⁴ In Germany, it was the nationwide miners' strike of 1889 that made the Prussian Ministry of the Interior and provincial governors discuss seriously the possibility of extending the civil forces (i.e. state police, municipal police and *gendarmierie*) in order to avoid dependence on military assistance in the future. The arguments were similar to those put forward in the French debate, namely that professional policemen and *gendarmes* could handle sensitive situations through their personal authority, whereas military presence might appear provocative and risked escalating confrontations.³⁵ At the same time, voices

from the military establishment in both France and Germany began to complain about the role of the army as a force of internal order. The military argument was that internal duties would drain military resources, break up training schedules, and affect the health and discipline of soldiers and officers.

General von Albedyll, the commander in charge of the intervention in Westphalia 1889, made clear that with labour conflicts increasing in scale and frequency, the army should not be involved except in extreme cases. If the military were to become involved, military commanders wanted to be able to choose the conflict and demanded a free hand to repress popular unrest with unrestricted military means. During the 1890s, several senior military commanders such as General von Loë and War Minister Bronsart von Schellendorf were similarly disinclined to allow the army to be used to protect private property or industrial interests against protesters. Even General von Waldersee, who frequently declared his determination to fight the social democrats with guns and bullets, was reluctant to deploy troops during a major strike which broke out in 1896–7 among the workers in the port of Hamburg.³⁶ In France, objections to the role of the army as a force of internal order had been voiced previously by a few senior officers in the early 1870s, but this only became a more generalized view within the military establishment after the turn of the twentieth century.³⁷

In response to these problems, French and Prussian police and *gendarmerie* forces were constantly increased from the 1890s onwards. However, a comparison of police and *gendarmerie* forces in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais indicates that, in fact, throughout the nineteenth century, both the French towns, with their municipal police, and rural areas, policed by the *gendarmerie*, were generally better provided with public forces than the Prussian communities. The comparison of civilian forces in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Westphalia comprises three elements:

- (1) the number of *gendarmes* to police rural areas;
- (2) the number of policemen in the urban areas;
- (3) the number of forces which could be transferred to the area in case of major conflict.

As shown in Table 2, the number of *gendarmes* in France was much higher than in Prussia, even when the population in Prussia came to outnumber the French.

Table 2
Number of *Gendarmes* in France and Prussia⁴⁰

	<i>Gendarmes</i>		Inhabitants	
	France	Prussia	France	Prussia
1872	18,120	3338	36,100,000	24,680,000
1901	20,850	5278	38,450,000	35,036,000
1907	26,000	5597	39,192,000	40,170,000

In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, there was in 1901 a force of 846 *gendarmes*³⁸ to police a region covering 12,400 km², with a total population of 2.9 million. By contrast, in the province of Westphalia, covering 20,200 km², the number of *gendarmes* increased from 269 to merely 544 between 1889 and 1914.³⁹ During the same period, the population increased from 2 million in 1882 to 4.1 million in 1913. At the eve of the outbreak of the First World War, the proportion of Prussian *gendarmes* in relation to the size of the population had scarcely improved and compared to the proportion of *gendarmes* in Nord-Pas-de-Calais it remained very low.

The towns of Nord-Pas-de-Calais were also better provided with municipal police than the rapidly-expanding industrial towns of Westphalia. While in 1889 the density of police forces in French province towns was around one policeman for every 1000–1500 inhabitants, this rate had improved by 1907 to an average of one policeman for every 881 inhabitants in towns with more than 30,000 inhabitants.⁴¹ A similar development can be observed for the larger towns in Nord-Pas-de-Calais; despite significant variations between the main towns, they all had a rate under one policeman per 900 inhabitants.⁴²

In the Ruhr area, the scarcity of municipal police remained a problem throughout the period investigated. Despite the significant increase after 1889 in the number of municipal policemen in the industrial towns around the river Ruhr, the rate of policemen per inhabitants in larger urban areas was constantly outnumbered by the growth of population.

In both countries, the scarcity of police and *gendarmes* forces made the local, regional and central authorities develop a nationwide coordination of available civilian forces that could be transferred to particular conflict areas in case of immediate need. The Prussian designation lists of 1911 operated with a force of 2046

Table 3
Density of Municipal Policemen in Main Towns of the Ruhr Area⁴⁴

	Inhabitants in 1890	Number of policemen	Inhabitants per policeman 1890	Inhabitants	Number of policemen	Inhabitants per policeman
Dortmund	88,000	69	1275	214,000	199	1075 (1909)
Essen	78,000	–	–	295,000	323	913 (1905)
Gelsenkirchen	28,000	9	3111	170,000	167	1017 (1910)
Bochum	47,000	37	1272	131,000	130	1007 (1908)
Hagen	34,000	21	1619	87,000	99	878 (1910)
Rechlinghausen	13,000	4	3250	54,000	53	1018 (1903)

gendarmes and policemen who could be transferred from other provinces to the three most unruly Prussian provinces (Westphalia, the Rhine Province and Silesia). Out of these, 1167 were to be moved to Westphalia.⁴³ In France, it was only the *gendarmierie* that could function as a national force of order. In 1901, the *gendarmierie* could establish a force of 3669 *gendarmes* to be moved to conflict areas and, in case of urgent need, it could be brought up to 6300 *gendarmes*.⁴⁵ Even if this force could not be used in its entirety, when several conflicts broke out simultaneously and had to be distributed among several unruly *départements*, it was still a considerable force compared to the Prussian designation of 2046 *gendarmes* and policemen that could be moved to the most unruly provinces.

If the French authorities pointed to the seriousness of the challenges to public order as well as the insufficiency of civilian forces in order to justify frequent calls upon the army, it is worth noting that not only were challenges to public order no more extended in Nord-Pas-de-Calais than they were in Westphalia, but generally, French towns and rural areas were also better provided with civilian forces than German areas.

Dissimilar Use of Military Resources

It was not simply that troops were requested more frequently in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. There were also significant differences in the ways in which the military troops appeared in conflict areas. Particular attention needs to be drawn to three aspects of the use of troops, all of which show that the French civilian authorities drew much more heavily on military resources than did their Prussian counterparts in Westphalia:

- (1) the size of conflicts to which troops would be called upon;
- (2) the number of soldiers and officers who were mobilized compared to the number of protesters; and
- (3) the length of intervention.

Types and Size of Conflicts Entailing Military Intervention

In Nord-Pas-de Calais the army was called upon to police a large variety of conflicts. Troops were called out for almost any conflict in the mining industry; however, the army were also called upon

in the case of strikes among dock workers, textile workers, rail workers and a large number of other sectors employing a significant number of workers. Similarly, soldiers were mobilized on a regular basis to areas that were considered particularly turbulent, mainly the ports of Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne-sur-Mer and the large towns, Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing. In Dunkirk, a medium-sized town with 38,000 inhabitants, there are fifteen recorded incidents of military intervention, mostly in relation to unrest among the 4000–6000 dock workers. This was despite the fact that Dunkirk was by far the most densely-policed town outside Paris, with one policeman for every 407 inhabitants in 1907.

Troops were also requested for minor conflicts or situations with very limited potential of unrest or violence. Among the eighty-three recorded incidents of military intervention in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, only eighteen involved more than 10,000 protesters, and in at least thirty out of the seventy-eight recorded cases did the conflict comprise fewer than 1000 protesters.⁴⁶ In nine out of the seventy-eight cases recorded in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, troops were called to strikes that comprised only a couple of hundred strikers or demonstrators. There are nineteen cases where military assistance can best be described as ordinary crowd management due to the gathering of a large number of people for whatever reason (e.g. fairs, public celebrations, Bastille Day, and protection of VIPs passing through the area). Finally, soldiers were mobilized at several occasions to undertake strikebound work that was considered essential for the functioning and well-being of wider society (ensuring the basic functioning of the rail or postal service, or the provision of gas and electricity).

In comparison, the conflicts to which the Prussian army was called or kept in a state of readiness were generally larger than the cases that triggered a military intervention in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. All military interventions in Westphalia after 1889 were linked to major strikes in the mining sector. At the same time, however, even extended incidents of popular protest — although regarded by Prussian authorities as constituting major public order problems — were sometimes managed without involving the army. During the Westphalian miners' strike of January 1905, when almost 200,000 went on strike, the military authorities were never called upon; similarly in other parts of Germany. In Hamburg, during a two-month strike among 33,000 dockworkers from November 1896 to January 1897, there were no

calls from the civilian administration for military involvement. In March 1906, during the nationwide social democratic demonstrations for a revision of the franchise to the Prussian Diet, policing was dealt with entirely by the police, and no evidence has been found of contact being made with the military authorities on that occasion.

Means of Intervention: Forces Mobilized Compared to Number of Protesters

When comparing the number of soldiers that were mobilized as well as the length of interventions, it appears again that the French authorities drew much more heavily on the army than their Prussian counterparts.

It is sometimes difficult to obtain exact data about the number of forces employed because dissimilar figures are mentioned with considerable discrepancy.⁴⁷ However, even when operating with maximum figures for the German case and minimum figures for the French case, the soldiers mobilized in Nord-Pas-de-Calais largely outnumber those mobilized in Westphalia. The tendency to mobilize very large numbers of troops in Nord-Pas-de-Calais had already begun in the early 1890s, but during the conflicts after the turn of the century, the number of mobilized soldiers became virtually astronomic. Table 4 details the most important conflicts in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and shows the generally high proportions of soldiers compared with the number of protesters.⁴⁸

That the authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais tended to mobilize very high numbers of soldiers for the number of *potential* protesters also appears clearly from the number of troops requested in relation to the protests against the implementation of the laws separating the French state and the Catholic Church. In March, and again in November 1906, military troops intervened on a massive scale. In the *arrondissement* of Lille, 1708 soldiers and officers were mobilized in one day to prevent demonstrations. In larger and middle-sized towns such as Roubaix (121,017 inhabitants) and Wattrelos (27,000 inhabitants), more than 1000 infantry soldiers and cavalry officers participated.⁴⁹ Villages with a total population of 1000–3000 inhabitants received a military presence around their local church of 150–200 infantry soldiers, 25–50 cavalry officers and 25–40 *gendarmes*.⁵⁰

Compared to these figures, the forces that were mobilized or

Table 4
Protesters and Forces Mobilized During Main Conflicts in Nord-Pas- de-Calais

	Number of protesters	Number of <i>gendarmes</i>	Number of soldiers	Soldiers per protesters
Miners' strike, Oct.–Nov. 1889	circa 13,000	(unknown)	1600	1 : 8
Miners' strike, Sept.–Nov. 1891	circa 15,000	180 external <i>gendarmes</i>	1987	1 : 7.5
Strike in several professions Sept–Nov 1893	at least 40,000	(unknown)	at least 4160	1 : 10
Strike in several professions Oct.–Nov. 1901	max. 14,700	344 external <i>gendarmes</i>	at least 6000	1 : 2.5
Miners' strike and dockers' strike Oct.–Dec. 1902	71,000 miners 4–5000 dockers	736 external <i>gendarmes</i>	16,715	1 : 4.5
Strike in several professions March–May 1906	max. 92,191 ⁵¹	at least 591 external <i>gendarmes</i>	35,000–38,000 ⁵²	1 : 2.6

Table 5
Protesters and Forces Mobilized During Main Conflicts in Westphalia

	Number of protesters	Police and <i>gendarmarie</i>	Number of soldiers	Ratio of forces : protesters
Miners' strike May 1889	90,000 miners	(unknown)	6000–8000 infantry soldiers ⁵³ and 800 cavalry soldiers	1 : 10 – 1 : 13
Miners' strike and riots in Herne June 1899	6000 miners	(unknown)	1800–2400 infantry soldiers and 100 cavalry soldiers	1 : 2.4 – 1 : 3
Miners' strike January 1905	200,000 miners	255 local <i>gendarmes</i> 1135 local policemen 704 external forces 2562 private guards	None	1 : 43
Miners' strike March 1912	190,000 miners	5658 police and <i>gendarmarie</i> forces 2000–3000 private guards	5000	1 : 14

kept ready to intervene during the major labour confrontations in Westphalia appear almost modest. Even when including both civil and military forces, the ratio of forces compared to the number of protesters are significantly lower than in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Only during the 1899 riots in Herne did the Prussian authorities respond to the challenge by mobilizing a very large number of men compared to the number of strikers and rioters that were involved.

While the proportion of soldiers and officers compared to the number of protesters was rendered only slightly higher in France by the major conflicts between 1889 and 1893 than the display of military force by the Westphalian miners' strike of 1889, the method of handling protest took diverging trajectories after the turn of the century. In France, the proportion of forces mobilized to the conflicts of the early twentieth-century was extremely high in relation to the number of protesters. By contrast, despite very high number of participants in the Westphalian miners' strikes of 1905 and 1912, the proportion of forces generally decreased from what it had been in 1889, and was extremely low compared to the proportions in Nord-Pas-de-Calais.

Duration of Intervention

Finally, the duration of military interventions also tended to be longer in Nord-Pas-de-Calais than Westphalia. Military interventions in Westphalia lasted for a few days and at most a couple of weeks, whereas the mobilization of the army in major conflicts in Nord-Pas-de-Calais lasted for two to three months in several cases.

This was due to quite dissimilar ways of using military troops. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, correspondence between the prefects in Lille and Arras with the general commander began at the mere rumour of a strike or demonstration. If the prefect considered an announced strike or demonstration to contain potential for unrest, troops would be mobilized and take up positions even before the strike had come into effect or demonstrators had gathered. Similarly, the troops were not sent back until the conflict had effectively ended. Incidents of violence and riots were therefore no precondition for military presence, and in the majority of cases the general commander could report afterwards that no incident of unrest had taken place.

By contrast in Westphalia — and in Germany as a whole — the army was called upon only when the civil and military authorities agreed that the police and *gendarmérie* could no longer manage on their own. Due to this ‘wait-and-see’ attitude troops were sometimes kept on standby, but never mobilized, and if they were mobilized they only arrived at a rather late stage of the conflict when violence and riots were widespread. In Westphalia, the civilian authorities were not only reluctant to involve the army, but also preferred to send the troops back as soon as possible in order to regain police control, which would be passed to the military authorities as long as troops were mobilized. For their part, the military authorities were not keen to spend time and resources on policing strikes and demonstrations, so in all incidents of military intervention, the civilian authorities had no problems convincing the general commander that it was time to send the troops back to their barracks when the police and *gendarmérie* thought the situation was sufficiently calm for them to handle it on their own.

The comparison of patterns of intervention shows that both in terms of the frequency of requisition of military assistance, the number of soldiers and officers mobilized compared to the number of protesters, as well as the duration of military presence, the prefects of ‘Nord’ and ‘Pas-de-Calais’ made far more extensive use of military resources than the civilian authorities in Westphalia. Not only were French troops mobilized for quite minor conflicts with limited potential for serious unrest, on the occasion of major strikes there also seems to be a disproportion between the number of strikers and soldiers that were mobilized to maintain public order.

Choice of Strategy: Prevention or Confrontation

How should the significantly stronger involvement of military presence in the French case be interpreted? The comparison with Germany poses the question of whether protest policing was more repressive in France than in Germany, where requisition of troops became quite rare. However, viewing the presence of French troops as nothing but sheer repression overlooks very important aspects that are related to the aims and intentions of the French authorities.

While in Prussia the demilitarization of public order took the clear form of government policy, military participation in protest policing in France was not stated as policy or even a strategic priority. However, in France military participation in large-scale policing operations appears in a number of contingency plans. These contingency plans were so frequently implemented that they became standard practice. It is through these contingency plans that it is possible to discern the strategic rationale behind massive and long-lasting military mobilization.

Officially, politicians and prefects would always claim that they did their best to avoid taking such measures but that it was the serious threat of violence and sabotage from radical groups among workers and trade unions that made such measures necessary. Given the sensitivity of the issue in France, one would expect significant variations over time, depending on the person holding office of interior minister. Instead, what we find is more than ad hoc measures implemented in isolated conflict. It is consistent and massive use of troops. What emerges from the comparison is two sets of policing strategies.

Towards Strategies for Preventive Policing

The ways in which troops were used in Nord-Pas-de-Calais quite closely reflects the strategies that were developed in a series of 'plans for protection' established between 1897 and 1914. These plans were developed by an inter-ministerial commission with participation from the War Ministry, the Ministry of the Interior as well as the prefects and general commanders from the *départements* most concerned by public disorder, notably 'Nord', 'Pas-de-Calais' and 'Rhone'.⁵⁴ Even if the measures described in the 'plans for protection' were only meant to be implemented in case of nationwide strikes within a few key sectors (railways, coal mines, ports and later, post and telegraph),⁵⁵ the measures linked to military interventions in Nord-Pas-de-Calais show striking similarities with the provisions and strategies described in the plans.

These strategic measures became standard for the policing of protest of any significance in areas outside Paris, and in Nord-Pas-de-Calais the provisions were implemented in adapted proportions to many different types of protest. The formal plans for protection therefore provide a key to understanding the strate-

gic aims and intentions behind military involvement in protest policing. There seems to be consistent strategic thought concerning the use and function of military troops, from the first plans for protection that were established in 1897–1898 to the latest revisions of the plans from 1913–14. The measures were based on three strategic principles. First, they operated by preventive mobilization, that is, placing soldiers at sensitive locations from the very beginning of a strike or a demonstration, with no regard as to whether violent actions had taken place.

Second was the mobilization of very large numbers of soldiers and officers, the number that was considered appropriate — and indeed necessary — to maintain public order increased significantly from the early plans of 1897–1898 to those of 1907. Thus, the number of soldiers which — according to the plans — were to be mobilized in Nord-Pas-de-Calais in case of a strike among rail workers increased from 1050 in 1899 to 2150 in 1907.⁵⁶ The plans concerning the outbreak of a major strike in the mining sector foresaw the mobilization of between 6450 and 7500 soldiers and officers as well as 365 *gendarmes*.⁵⁷ Similarly, the plans for protection operated with 2000 soldiers and 270–320 *gendarmes* to be mobilized to Dunkirk in case of a strike among the 4000–6000 dock workers at the port.⁵⁸ However, it was made clear that the number of troops stated in the plans was to be considered as a minimum that could be increased, depending on the circumstances.⁵⁹ As shown by the quantity of troops that were mobilized during major conflicts in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, these largely exceeded the numbers of troops stated in the formal plans.

Third, the key element in the plans was the function attributed to the troops. In the plans of 1901, it had been stressed previously that the function of the soldiers was to stand behind the *gendarmes* and policemen in order to prevent strikers from coming close to sensitive locations (i.e. a factory, mine shaft, port installations or railroads). For example, mobilization of 2000 soldiers to Dunkirk, a medium-sized town of 38,000 inhabitants, was due to the size of the port and its expensive installations, rather than the number of potential strikers. The soldiers' main task was to constitute a 'human wall', while it was left to the policemen or *gendarmes* to intervene against individuals in the crowd.

The function of military troops was oriented primarily towards prevention of attacks on persons and material rather than on repressive action against protesters: soldiers and officers had

clear orders **not** to react even when abused and targeted with stones and other objects; only if their positions could not be held without the use of force were the officers allowed to order the soldiers to intervene.⁶⁰ This was the principle as defined in the plans for protection. Unsurprisingly, it proved difficult to uphold this level of self-restraint in practice, and there are many examples of strikes developing into generalized battles between workers and soldiers. On the other hand, it is important to stress that in the vast majority of incidents from Nord-Pas-de-Calais to which the army was sent, soldiers and officers were simply bystanders and interaction with protesters never went beyond verbal abuse and stone-throwing.

In order to adequately understand the nature of protest policing in France and the role of the army as a force of internal order, it is important to recognize that the primary aim of military presence was preventive rather than repressive. However, the strategies of prevention required very significant displays of force, and outside Paris, the army was the only organization capable of delivering such important numbers of personnel.

The Function of German Troops in Protest Policing

Comparing the French case with the priorities behind the strategies for policing in Westphalia, two features appear remarkably different. First, in Westphalia the function of troops when called to deal with public protest remained narrowly concentrated on confrontation. Troops only intervened at a very late stage of a conflict when violence had already occurred and situations were generally chaotic. The task of the military troops was to break up public gatherings, to intervene against rioters, and to impose absolute calm through military patrols in the area.

Moreover, the German authorities — despite this policy of demilitarization of domestic peacekeeping — still operated with a concept of war-like confrontation with the population. In the plans for protection developed by the civil authorities in Westphalia in 1904, and after the miners' strike of 1912, the authorities accepted a considerable risk of losing control.⁶¹ As late as 1909–10, local and district governors were painfully aware of their inadequate police force.⁶² If Prussian authorities chose to take this risk and deal with strikes or demonstrations comprising several hundred thousand participants with a rather limited num-

ber of police and *gendarmérie* forces, it was because they relied on the army to ultimately repress any riot through unlimited display of force.

For their part, the senior military commanders prepared for a situation of civil war-like repression of internal unrest.⁶³ Even if none of the military interventions occurring in Germany between 1889 and 1914 developed into full-scale confrontation, studies of the Prussian military leave no doubt of the readiness of the military authorities for unlimited repression of unrest.

While French strategies for policing of public protest were all aimed at preventing a conflict from developing into full-scale confrontation — with the repression of the Paris *Commune* as the nightmare scenario to be avoided at any price — the Prussian General Staff referred directly to the *Commune* as an example of how major unrest could be dealt with in German cities.⁶⁴ Similarly, some of the German military plans operated with machine gun units to fight in the streets and demolish workers' houses.⁶⁵ Whereas the extremely frequent and extended use of military troops in Nord-Pas-de-Calais was linked to a strategy of preventative policing, the function of military intervention in Westphalia was aimed increasingly at confrontation with protesters.

Conclusion

The figures presented in this article indicate that the extremely frequent calls upon the army to ensure the maintenance of public order in Nord-Pas-de-Calais was not simply a response to situations of immediate and uncontrollable challenge to the social and political order. Indeed, the French Third Republic was challenged by serious unrest both from the anti-Republican right and from anarchists and revolutionary left-wing groups. However, the requisition for military assistance to the police and *gendarmérie* went far beyond incidents of public gathering that could be in any way described as subversive.

The comparison of the patterns of military intervention in the unruly area of Nord-Pas-de-Calais with the policing measures implemented in the significantly larger industrial areas of the German Ruhr district allows three observations to be made. First, the French army was not called upon simply in situations

of extreme urgency, but was mobilized as a preventive measure on the basis of expectations of violent unrest. Troops were generally mobilized by the beginning of a strike or demonstration and did not return until the conflict had effectively ended. By contrast, in Westphalia, calling upon the army was a last resort. Troops did not intervene until violence and riots had reached the level where the police and *gendarmerie* could no longer control the situation, and the soldiers were sent back as soon as control had been restored.

Second, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais the number of soldiers and officers that were mobilized to handle potentially violent conflicts was set systematically at a very high level, which appears rather out of proportion compared to the number of people participating in the strikes and demonstrations. The high number of troops mobilized in Nord-Pas-de-Calais is compatible with the number of troops that were foreseen by the formal plans for protection in case of major internal conflicts. Conversely, the number of forces that were employed for protest policing in Westphalia — including private guards — were consistently lower than in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Finally, it is important to note that this was despite the fact that the towns and rural areas in Nord-Pas-de-Calais were no less provided with local police and *gendarmerie* than the local communities in Westphalia.

Third, instead of linking the extended use of military troops for protest policing in France to the level of challenge to the social and political order of the French Third Republic, these findings suggest that the use of military troops as a force of internal order was linked to dissimilar strategic intentions and priorities in relation to protesters, as well as different aims in terms of controlling small-scale unrest. The fundamental difference between the strategies for protest policing in France and Germany was the attempt in France to contain the potential for unrest by mobilizing a very large number of forces from the very beginning of a conflict. In Paris, where the police was sufficiently strong to deliver a significant number of personnel from its own forces, the army was only called out very occasionally; outside Paris, however, the army was the only organization capable of delivering the requisite forces necessary to implement this strategy.

The repeated requisition of the French army as an extended police force seriously impeded effective protest and the responsible authorities were constantly accused of using the army as a

means of intimidation and violent repression. These were not vain allegations: incidents of violent clashes between protesters and public forces, including soldiers and officers, were numerous, and on several occasions, soldiers were ordered to shoot into the crowd. On the other hand, given the frequency of military involvement in protest policing, it is also worth noting that open confrontation between soldiers and protesters was the exception rather than the rule, and that in most cases the soldiers and officers simply stood passively behind the police and *gendarmérie*; and most importantly, this was the role that was defined in the orders given to commanding officers.

The dissimilar conditions which triggered military presence in France and Germany are crucial to an adequate interpretation of the intentions behind military involvement in the two countries. As German authorities increasingly tried to handle protest policing through police and *gendarmérie* forces, the requisition of the army was a clear signal of 'zero tolerance' and an implicit threat of heavy-handed intervention against protesters. In France, by contrast, the presence of military troops merely indicated that the prefect considered the strike or protest to be of some significance. Therefore, the increasingly frequent involvement of the French army in the policing of a strike or a demonstration must be seen in the light of preventive policing strategies rather than an indicator of successive governments' readiness to deal with protesters through violent repression.

Notes

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3. On the use of troops in the Netherlands, see Ronald van der Wal, *Or Force Will Be Used! Military Assistance at the Maintenance and the Reimposition of Public Order 1840–1920* (Hilversum 2003).

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161–2; Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Das Deutsche Kaiserreich: 1871–1918* (Göttingen 1973), 237; Manfred Messerschmidt, 'Preussens Militär in seinem gesellschaftlichen Umwelt', in Jürgen Puhle, ed., *Preussen im Rückblick* (Göttingen 1980), 68; Wilhelm Deist, 'Die Armee in Staat und Gesellschaft 1890–1914', *Militär Staat und Gesellschaft 1890–1914* (Freiburg 1991), 25–8; Volker R. Berghahn, *Imperial Germany 1871–1914* (Oxford 1994), 257–9.

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7. Albrecht Funk, *Polizei und Rechtsstaat. Die Entstehung des Staatsrechtlichen Gewaltsmonopol in Preussen, 1848–1918* (Frankfurt am Main 1986); Hansjoachim Henning, 'Staatsmacht und Arbeitskampf. Die Haltung der preussischen Innenverwaltung zum Militäreinsatz während der Bergarbeiterausstände 1889–1912', in Henning, ed., *Wirtschafts- und sozialgeschichtlich Forschungen und Probleme. Festschrift für K.E. Born* (St Katharinen 1987); Elaine Glovka Spencer, *Management and Labor in Imperial Germany. Ruhr Industrialists as Employers, 1896–1914* (New Brunswick, NJ 1984); Elaine Glovka Spencer, 'Police–Military Relations in Prussia, 1848–1914', *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 19 (1985); Elaine Glovka Spencer, *Police and Social Order in German Cities: The Düsseldorf District, 1848–1914* (1992); Ralph Jessen, *Polizei im Industrierevier* (Göttingen 1991); Ralph Jessen, 'Unternehmerherrschaft und staatliches Gewaltmonopol. Hüttenpolizisten und Zechenvehren im Ruhrgebiet 1870–1914', in Alf Lütke, ed., *Sicherheit und Wohlfahrt: Polizei, Gesellschaft und Herrschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt 1992).

8. Funk, op. cit.

9. Funk, op. cit., 155–6; Spencer, op. cit., 136–7; Jessen, op. cit., 78–9.

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16. Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly and Richard Tilly, *The Rebellious Century 1830–1930* (Cambridge, MA 1975), 212–26.

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18. Anja Johansen, *Bureaucrats, Generals and the Domestic Use of Military Troops. Patterns of Civil–Military Co-operation Concerning Maintenance of Public Order in French and Prussian Industrial Areas, 1889–1914* (Florence 1998) appendices 2 and 3.

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23. Perrot, *Les ouvriers en grève, France 1870–1890*, (Lille 1975), 183, 195

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29. Friedhelm Böll, *Arbeitskämpfe und Gewerkschaften in Deutschland, England und Frankreich* (Bonn 1992), 62; Perrot, *Les ouvriers en grève, France 1870–1890* (Lille 1975), 51.

30. Richard Evans, *Rethinking German History* (London 1991), 171–3.

31. Trespé, op. cit., 249–50.

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35. Funk, op. cit., 155–6; Jessen, *Polizei im Industrieviertel*, 128; Spencer, *Police and Social Order*, 86–7.
36. MHaStA, OP 2847b, documents 7–9, letter of 1 July 1889 from General von Albedyll to Wilhelm II; letter of 24 April 1890 from General von Loë to General von Waldersee. Alfred Graf von Waldersee, *Denkwürdigkeiten des Generalfeld-Marchalls Alfred von Waldersee* (ed. H.O Meisner) (Berlin 1922). Vol. 2, diary entries of 29 November and 2 December 1896.
37. Serman, op. cit., 60–3; Jauffret, op. cit., 98–114.
38. Paris National Archive (hereafter PNA), F.7.12780, ‘Forces de gendarmerie disponibles sur l’ensemble du territoire’, 1901.
39. Jessen, op. cit., Table 5.
40. Funk, op. cit., 212–3; Jessen, op. cit., Tables 5–6; Jauffret, op. cit., 125; Carrot, *Le maintien de l’ordre*, op. cit., 654.
41. Berlière (1996), 28.
42. Peter Flora, Franz Kraus and Winifried Pfenning, *State, Economy and Society in Western Europe, 1815–1975* (Frankfurt am Main 1983–7); Berlière (1996), 26–8.
43. Funk, op. cit., 308.
44. Flora, op. cit.; Funk, op. cit., 212–3, 308; Jessen, op. cit., Table 6.
45. PNA, F.7.12780, ‘Forces de gendarmerie disponibles sur l’ensemble du territoire’, 1901.
46. Johansen, op. cit., Appendix 3.
47. The military authorities often mention only the number of military units without stating the number of men comprising each unit.
48. The figures for strikers concern only the number officially registered; this can be misleading because demonstrations during labour conflicts generally involved the entire family of strikers; however, the officially registered number of strikers provides a basis of comparison between the French and Prussian case.
49. PNA, F.7.12399, Letter of 3 March 1906 from the prefect of the *département* Nord to the Ministry of the Interior.
50. Vincennes Military Archivist (VMA), I.A.C./2.I.335, report from the general of staff of the garrison at Lille.
51. The number of the officially registered strikers in Nord and Pas-de-Calais for the entire year.
52. On 20 April 1906, 20,000 soldiers were mobilized in Lens, an industrial town of 32,000 inhabitants, due to a meeting of striking miners. During the discussions which followed in the Ministry of the Interior, a number as high as 52,000 soldiers were said to be mobilized in Nord-Pas-de-Calais between March and May 1906. PNA, F.7.12913, ‘Commissions et sous-commissions institutées en vue d’examiner les mesures à prendre en cas de grève’.
53. Ten battalions were mobilized. In Prussia a battalion comprised 600–800 men.
54. A notable exception is Diana Cooper-Richet on the implementation of the plans for protection in September–November 1902: Diana Cooper-Richet, ‘Le plan général de protection à l’épreuve de la grève des mineurs du Nord-Pas-de-Calais, (sept.–nov. 1902)’, in Philippe Vigier, ed., *Maintien de l’ordre et polices* (1987).

55. PNA, F.7.12774-12779; F.7.12912-12913. Plans, minutes and correspondence concerning the implementation of these plans, 1897–1913.

56. PNA, F.7.12912, 'Modifications au plan de protection des voies ferrés approuvé en 1902, en cas de grève des Employés de Chemins de Fer'.

57. The exact number is impossible to state because sometimes only the number of military units are mentioned without stating the number of men per unit. PNA, F.7.12779: 'Etat des troupes d'infanterie, de cavalerie, du génie et de gendarmerie, mises à la disposition du Préfet du Nord par M. le Général Commandant le 1er Corps d'Armée dans l'éventualité de la grève, Octobre 1901.'

58. PNA, F.7.12777, Note from the Minister of the Interior, October 1901.

59. DAL, M 622 /2, letter of 12 December 1898 from the interior minister to all prefects; PNA, F.7.12912 'Rapport confidentiel au sujet des mesures à prendre en cas de grève particulière ou totale des employés ou ouvriers des compagnies de chemins de fer', 15 May 1908.

60. PNA, F.7.12778, 'Instructions générales dans l'éventualité d'une grève générale des mineurs', 16 October 1901.

61. GSBD, H.A.1.-Rep.77-title 2513,1/9 (documents 124–130), minutes from a meeting by the district governor in Düsseldorf, 7 July 1904. Münster Hauptstaatsarchiv (MHSA), district governor in Münster, VII-14 Bd.1/32-1 or GSBD, H.A.1.-Rep.77-Titel 2523/1, Anh.1. Vol. 20, minutes from a meeting hosted by the local governor in Essen, 1 July 1912.

62. GSBD, H.A.1.-Rep.77-Titel 2513, 1 (Beiheft 12), documents 371–377.

63. The idea of dealing with protesters through military means is described in a series of instructions for the province of Westphalia that were issued by General von Bissing in 1907, a General Staff study entitled *Kampf in insurgierten Städten* also from 1907, and instructions from General von Hindenburg after his intervention in the Mansfeld coal area in 1909.

64. General Staff Study *Kampf in insurgierten Städten* 1907, Central Archive, Potsdam III, R43, film signature 12425–12426.

65. Central Archive, Potsdam III, R43, film signature 12425–12426, Order of 30 April 1907 from General von Bissing '*Verhalten bei inneren Unruhen*'; Bavarian Central Archive, Military Archive, MKR 2497, Order of 4 February 1908 from General von Hindenburg, '*Bestimmungen über die Verwendung von Truppen zur Unterdrückung innerer Unruhen*'.

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